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DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO PROTECTION: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
CONSIDERS CHILD ABUSE AND GOOD FAITH
IMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held inJensen v. Conrad' that as of 1979 state and local officials
could not be held liable under section 19832 for the deaths of
abused children, even if the officials were aware of the children's
plight. The court stated in dicta, however, that such children may
now enjoy a federal due process right to be protected by the state
from their abusers3 and may vindicate that right by bringing suit
under section 1983. 4 It held that because the deaths in question
occurred before this right was "clearly established," the defendantofficials enjoyed good faith immunity from suit. 5
This Note evaluates theJensen decision and discusses the merits
of a section 1983 claim based on the violation of a fourteenth
amendment right to be protected by the state from harm inflicted by
third parties. Part I reviews theJensen decision and its discussion of
6
the development of the fourteenth amendment right to protection.
Part II proposes a test designed to evaluate the merits of a claim that
one's fourteenth amendment right to protection has been violated
7
when, as inJensen, the injured party was not in the state's custody.
Part III discusses the good faith immunity doctrine and argues that
courts should not grant immunity to government officials who vio-

l 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1985)
(No. 84-1159).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress.
3 This Note draws no distinction between abuse by parents and abuse by others
within the family setting. Jensen considered two abused children, one of whom was
abused by his mother's boyfriend. See infra text accompanying note 11. The other was
abused by her mother and possibly her mother's boyfriend. See infra text accompanying
notes 15-20.
4 747 F.2d at 194; see infra discussion in part II.
5 747 F.2d at 194-95; see infra discussion in part III.
6 See infra notes 10-70 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 71-136 and accompanying text.
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late rights clearly established by state law even if those rights were
not clearly established by federal law." Part IV applies the principles
suggested by this Note to the Jensen case. 9 It concludes that the
court should not have immunized all of the defendants from suit,
but should have reached the merits of one of the claims presented
and dismissed it as a matter of law.
I
THE CASE

A.

Background

TheJensen case is a consolidated appeal of two contemporaneous decisions from different divisions of the United States District
Court of South Carolina. In one case,Jensen,Administratrix of the Estate of Clark v. Conrad,10 a three-year old boy was beaten to death by
his mother's live-in boyfriend four months after the county department of social services had received a report alleging abuse of the
boy's older brother. I The plaintiff alleged that the department inadequately investigated the report, failed to locate the family, and
wrongfully closed the case.' 2 In the other case,Jensen,Administratrix
of the Estate of Brown v. Conrad,13 while a county hospital was treating
a four-month-old girl for a fractured skull, 14 hospital officials observed the boyfriend of the child's mother handle the infant
roughly 15 and reported her suspected abuse to the county child protection agency. 16 Agency caseworkers apparently contacted the
mother,' 7 who allegedly agreed to live with her daughter at the
8 See infra notes 137-59 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 160-79 and accompanying text.
10 570 F. Supp. 114 (D.S.C. 1983) (Anderson Division) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
11 Id. at 119. The boyfriend was convicted of the boy's murder. Jensen, 747 F.2d at
188.
12 Clark, 570 F. Supp. at 120. Appellant blamed the State Department of Social
Services for failing to properly train caseworkers and the County Department of Social
Services for hiring inadequately trained personnel:
Plaintiff specifically maintains that [decedent's] death was not prevented,
as it could have been through proper protective service intervention, because caseworkers were not taught essential investigatory techniques necessary to locate the parents or guardians of children who are suspected to
be victims of abuse.
Id.
13 570 F. Supp. 91 (D.S.C. 1983) (Columbia Division) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
14 Jensen, 747 F.2d at 187.
15 The boyfriend "held the child by the head and neck, and slapped [her] in a rough
manner." Id.
16 Id.
17 It is unclear how much contact the agency had with the mother or her child. The
court stated only that "after an initial review of the case" an agreement was reached with
the mother. Id. The precise facts of the state's interaction with the family are important
to an analysis of the child's rights. See infra note 178.
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home of the child's grandmother, on pain of forfeiting custody of
the infant.1 8 The plaintiff alleged that the agency failed to adequately supervise the mother and to enforce the terms of the agreement despite knowledge that the child and her mother were not
living at the grandmother's house. 19 Two and a half months after
the initial hospital visit the girl suffered a brain hemorrhage and
20
died.
In both cases, the plaintiff brought suit under section 1983
against the Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Social Services, state and county department board members, and
state and county social workers. The plaintiff argued in both cases
that the South Carolina Child Protection Act 21 created a "special
relationship" between the state and the children by bringing them
under the state's care. 2 2 The plaintiff asserted that this special relationship gave rise in the children to a substantive due process right
under the fourteenth amendment to be protected by the state from
their abusers. 2 3 The fourteenth amendment assertedly also imposed on the state a correlative duty to protect the children. Finally,
the plaintiff claimed that the state breached this duty by its inaction
and/or malfeasance. 2 4 Defendants in both cases moved to dismiss
18
19

747 F.2d at 187-88.
Id. at 188.

Id. The child's mother "pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter." Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-480 to -780 (Law. Co-op. 1985). It is the purpose of the
Act, inter alia, to "save [abused and neglected children] from injury and harm by establishing an effective reporting system and encouraging the reporting of the children in
need of protection; [and] by establishing an effective system of services throughout the
State to safeguard the well-being and development of endangered children." Id. at
§ 20-7-480.
22 E.g., Clark, 570 F. Supp. at 121-22.
23
747 F.2d at 189. TheJensen court did not characterize this right as "liberty" or
"property." Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 29. Appellant claimed in Brown
below that defendants had deprived the decedent child of her "right to life." 570 F.
Supp. at 105. In theJensen court's view, however, the right to protection arises in certain
situations from the fourteenth amendment due process clause itself and not from one of
the life, liberty, or property interests it protects. See infra text accompanying notes 33-63
(Jensen court's analysis of case law bearing on question of fourteenth amendment right to
protection). Other courts have deemed the right to protection a subtantive due process
right. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) (involuntarily committed mental patient's right to safety is liberty interest under fourteenth amendment);
Gann v. Delaware State Hosp., 543 F. Supp. 268, 273 & n.6 (D. Del. 1982) (state's failure
to protect decedent hospital patient gave rise to substantive due process claim). A procedural due process claim might be made on the facts of Clark, but in such a claim the
substantive right allegedly deprived without procedural due process is not the fourteenth amendment right to protection, but rather is a substantive right arising under
state law. See infra note 179. The substantive right asserted inJensen arises under the
fourteenth amendment, but is triggered by a relationship between the holder of the
right and the state, created by state law or, as this Note suggests, by state risk-creating
action. See infra discussion in part II.
24
747 F.2d at 189.
20
21
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25

the complaint.
The Brown court dismissed the suit as to all defendants on the
ground that an affirmative constitutional duty to protect arises only
when the state assumes custody over the injured party. 26 The Clark
court, however, determined that the State Child Protection Act put
the victims under South Carolina's care and concluded that the relationship between child and state thus established by state statute
could give rise to a federal constitutional duty to protect. 27 Finding,
however, that such a duty had not been "clearly established" by
state or federal law, the court extended good faith immunity to the
state and county board members and granted summary judgment in
their favor. 28 The appeals from Clark and Brown thus presented the
Brown, 570 F. Supp. at 96; Clark, 570 F. Supp. at 119.
Brown, 570 F. Supp. at 110-11, 114; see also Bailey v. County of York, 580 F. Supp.
794, 794-97 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (on similar facts agreeing with Brown that custody or state's
direct control or supervision of abusive actor is necessary to convert state's failure to act
into constitutional violation).
TheJensen court misread Brown as holding that a duty to protect arises only when
"legal custody or direct supervisory control of the victim l[ies] in the hands of the state." 747
F.2d at 189-90 (emphasis added). Brown actually held that legal custody of the victim
"and/or direct supervisory control over or regulation of" the abusive party are necessary
to finding state action violative of the fourteenth amendment. 570 F. Supp. at 110. The
Brown court distinguished Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d
Cir. 1981) (on remand, trial court enteredjudgment n.o.v. for defendant afterjury verdict for plaintiff), rev'd, 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 195 (1983), in which
the Second Circuit held that a foster child's fourteenth amendment rights could be violated by her state-regulated foster father, in part because the state's regulation of the
foster father made it more logical to impute his action to the state. 570 F. Supp. at 10911; see infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. These factors were important to the
Brown court because its analysis focused on whether state action could be found that
deprived the decedent of her life. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. The proper
view of Doe, according to theJensen court and this Note, is that the state's assertion of
legal custody over the child-plaintiff triggered a fourteenth amendment right to protection in the child, and it is that right, not the right to life, that was denied by the state's
failure to protect the decedent in Doe from her abusive foster father. See infra notes 4243 (discussion of Doe), 54 (discussion of Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983)), 8689 (arguing that when state creates risk to individual by placing him in custody, state
owes individual a right to protection), and accompanying text.
27
570 F. Supp. at 121-22. The Clark court noted the section of the act that provides, in part: "'Within twenty-four hours of the receipt of a report of suspected child
abuse or neglect, the agency shall commence an appropriate and thorough investigation....'" Id. at 122 n.13 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op.
1985)). This Note contends that a state's creation of a statutory duty to come to the aid
of some of its residents, without more, is insufficient to trigger a fourteenth amendment
right to protection and its correlative duty to protect. See infra discussion in part II.
28
570 F. Supp. at 125-30. The court did not expressly include the State Commissioner in its grant of immunity, but it seems likely that the Commissioner, as a part of
the Department of Social Services, would be immunized as well. The Clark court treated
defendants' motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment, id. at 119, but denied
the motion as to the caseworkers involved. Id. at 127-28; see infra notes 167-70 and
accompanying text. TheJensen court declined to rule on the Clark court's denial of summary judgment to the caseworkers because proceedings below as to the caseworkers
were still pending at the time the appeal was filed. 747 F.2d at 187 n.1. Because the
25
26
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Jensen court with two issues: "[First,] whether the fourteenth
amendment affords the appellants a right to affirmative protection
by the state, and [second,] if such a right presently exists, whether it
was established clearly enough at the time the alleged deprivation
occurred to avert the application of good faith immunity ....*29
B.

The Decision

InJensen the Fourth Circuit reviewed the federal case law establishing a state's affirmative constitutional duty to protect an inhabitant from a third party. The Jensen court concluded that although
initially the eighth amendment imposed such a duty only in prison
settings, the fourteenth amendment may now impose a similar duty
30
in other settings, including those presented by theJensen appeals.
The court declined to decide this issue, however, and held instead
that the defendants were entitled to good faith immunity from suit
under Harlow v. Fitzgerald3 because the children's fourteenth
established" at the
amendment right to protection was not "clearly
32
time of the alleged deprivations in this case.
TheJensen court traced the doctrine of a constitutional duty to
protect and its correlative constitutional right to protection back to
Estelle v. Gamble.33 In Estelle the Supreme Court held that a state
prison inmate had an eighth amendment right3 4 to medical care
which would be violated if prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to his medical needs.3 5 TheJensen court noted the Estelle
court's rationale: that the state rendered the inmate incapable of
caring for himself by depriving him of his liberty and thus acquired
36
an obligation to care for him.
According to the Jensen court, the Supreme Court began expanding the Estelle doctrine beyond the prison setting in Martinez v.
California.3 7 In Martinez a sex offender, paroled after five years of his
one to twenty year sentence, murdered a fifteen-year-old girl five
Jensen court's decision granting immunity to all remaining defendants expressly disapproves the Clark court's reasons for denying immunity to the caseworkers, it is safe to
conclude that the claim against them will be dismissed. This Note, however, contends
that the Clark court's ruling on immunity was correct and that the court should have
reached the merits of the claim against the caseworkers in that case. See infra discussion
in part IV.
29
747 F.2d at 190.
30 Id. at 190-94. See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
31 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
747 F.2d at 194-95. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
32
33 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (discussed inJensen, 747 F.2d at 190-91).
34 The eighth amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
35 429 U.S. at 104-05.
36 Id at 103-04;Jensen, 747 F.2d at 191.
37 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (discussed inJensen, 747 F.2d at 191-92).
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months after his release.3 8 "[R]ather than addressing directly the
issue of whether [the decedent] had a constitutional right to protection under the fourteenth amendment," theJensen court explained,
the Supreme Court held that the parolee's action was too attenuated
from his release on parole to hold the state parole board liable for
the harm.39 Because the Martinez Court carefully limited its holding
to "the particular circumstance of this parole decision," 40 theJensen
court speculated that "in another setting the fourteenth amendment
right asserted by Martinez might be upheld in a § 1983 suit." 4 1 The
Jensen court thus read Martinez as laying the groundwork for the future expansion of the fourteenth amendment right to protection.
Since the Martinez decision, the Jensen court continued, three
courts of appeals have extended the constitutional right to protection into nonprison settings, basing the right on the fourteenth
amendment. TheJensen court first considered Doe v. New York City
Department of Social Services.4 2 In Doe I the Second Circuit held that
the city's failure to protect foster children in its legal custody from
abuse in their private, city-regulated foster home would violate the
children's constitutionally protected liberty or property rights if the
city's failure to act was due to deliberate indifference. 4 3 Next, the
Jensen court discussed Bowers v. DeVito, 4 4 in which the Seventh Circuit
held that a state mental hospital had not violated the constitutional
rights of a woman murdered by a violent schizophrenic one year
after his release from the hospital. The Bowers court ruled that
"there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against
being murdered by criminals or madmen." 4 5 As an exception to
this rule, however, the Bowers court recognized that the state's failure to protect someone it has specifically endangered may violate
due process. 46 Although Bowers discussed only eighth amendment
prison cases as examples of this exception, 4 7 theJensen court interId. at 279-80.
747 F.2d at 191 (reciting facts of Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285).
444 U.S. at 285.
41
747 F.2d at 191; see infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing Martinez case as intimating that a fourteenth amendment right to protection might exist in
custodial setting).
42
649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussed inJensen, 747 F.2d at 192) (on remand,
trial court entered judgment n.o.v. for defendant after jury verdict for plaintiff), rev'd,
709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 195 (1983)) [the decision announced in
649 F.2d hereinafter will be cited as Doe I.].
43 Id. at 141-42. The Doe I case "marked the first time that the eighth amendment
analysis had been applied to a traditional fourteenth amendment claim." Jensen, 747
F.2d at 192.
44
686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussed inJensen, 747 F.2d at 192-93).
45 Id. at 618.
46 Id.
47 Id. The Bowers court cited Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974),
38
39
40
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preted this passage broadly to mean that a right to protection is triggered not by the "precise type of relationship" between state and
48
victim, but by the state's endangerment of the victim.
Finally, theJensen court assessed its own decision, Fox v. Custis,49
in which a state parolee set fire to a claimant's house and inflicted
injuries upon two other claimants. 50 In denying the claimants relief,
the Fox court first concluded that the causal link between the state's
release of the parolee and the claimant's injuries was too weak to
impute liability to the state. 51 As in Martinez, the claim failed for lack
of causation. 5 2 More significant to theJensen court, however, was the
Fox court's adoption and expansion of the principles set forth in
5
Bowers. 3
The Jensen court emphasized two aspects of that expansion.
First, the Fox opinion defined the scope of the fourteenth amendment right to protection by reference to eighth amendment considerations more expressly than did either Bowers or Doe 1.54 TheJensen
court read Fox as requiring fourteenth amendment protection when,
as in the eighth amendment cases, "the state has selected an individual from the public at large and placed him in a position of danger." 5 5 Fox thus recognized that state endangerment of the victim
justifies a fourteenth amendment right to protection. Second, the
Jensen court noted that "the Fox ruling . . . stated in terms more
explicit than Bowers that a right to affirmative protection. . . could
arise from a custodial or other relationship."' 56 In Fox, however, the
plaintiffs failed to allege any "special relationship" 57 with the state;
however, in which the Seventh Circuit held that a state hospital patient had a fourteenth
amendment right to protection from other patients.
747 F.2d at 193. The court stated:
48
Significantly, the [Bowers] court did not draw a distinction between "custodial" and "other" relationships. In this sense, Bowers moved one step
beyond Doe. Rather than implicitly limiting government liberty [sic] to
custodial relationships the Bowers court chose to speak in broader terms;
in the court's view, it was not the precise type of relationship that mattered, but whether the government had placed an individual in danger.
Id. (footnote omitted).
49
712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983).
50
51

Id. at 86.
Id. at 87.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
747 F.2d at 193 (discussing Fox, 712 F.2d at 88).
712 F.2d at 88 (discussed inJensen, 747 F.2d at 193-94).
55 747 F.2d at 194 (discussing Fox, 712 F.2d at 88).
56 Id. at 194 (emphasis in original).
57 Id. The term "special relationship," as used by theJensen court, refers to relationships between the state and citizens giving rise to a fourteenth amendment right to
protection. Id. TheJensen court drew the term from the Fox opinion, which stated that
"[a] right [to protection] and corollary duty may arise out of special custodial or other
relationships created or assumed by the state in respect of particular persons." Fox, 712
F.2d at 88 (emphasis in original). The adjective "special" applies to both "custodial"
52

53
54
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hence, the court did not address what relationships will trigger a
58
right to protection.
TheJensen court did not discuss Youngberg v. Romeo, 5 9 an earlier
case in which the Supreme Court explicitly recognized a fourteenth
amendment right to protection in a custodial setting other than a
prison. Given theJensen court's concern with"whether a right to protection could arise when the state does not have custody over the
injured individual, the omission is not surprising. In Youngberg a patient in a state mental hospital was injured by his fellow patients.6 0
The plaintiff asserted that he had a fourteenth amendment right to
be protected from such harm and that his custodians violated this
right by failing to ensure his safety. 6 1 The Supreme Court agreed,
holding that patients in state mental hospitals have a fourteenth
amendment right to "conditions of reasonable . . . safety," 6 2 similar to the right to protection enjoyed by prisoners under the eighth
63
amendment.
Although the Jensen court acknowledged that a fourteenth
amendment right to protection may exist under the present facts,
the court held that the plaintiffs could not invoke such a right
against the defendants. The court found that good faith immunity
and "other" relationships. SeeJensen, 747 F.2d at 194-95 n.1 1 (detailing some of factors
includable in "special relationship" analysis). As discussed infra, custodial relationships
are inherently "special," see infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. The issue in this
Note is which noncustodial relationships are "special." This Note uses the term "special
relationship" to mean noncustodial relationships that give rise to a due process right to
protection.
58 ". . . Fox left the inquiry nearly as open-ended as Martinez, for it did not purport
to delimit the scope of the right." Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194. This statement inexplicably
ignores Fox's recognition that the fourteenth amendment right to protection should
arise only when the state has affirmatively endangered an individual, a point theJensen
court itself considered an important expansion of the Bowers holding. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. This Note suggests that such endangerment is essential to
finding a fourteenth amendment right to protection and is, therefore, the primary criterion of a special relationship test. See infra discussion in part II.A.
59 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Youngberg preceded two of the cases-Fox v. Custis, 712
F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983), and Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)-discussed
by theJensen court. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussion ofJenson
court's analysis of Bowers); notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussion of Jensen
court's analysis of Fox). As didJensen, both Bowers and Fox ignored the Youngberg decision, perhaps because the Youngberg holding that state mental patients have a fourteenth
amendment right to minimal training "to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint" is the controversial aspect of the decision. 457 U.S. at 319; see also, e.g., The
Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4, 77-86 (1982) (discussion of Youngberg entitled Right to Trainingfor the Mentally Retarded).
60
Plaintiff-patient, himself prone to violence, allegedly suffered injury on 63 occasions in less than two and one half years. 457 U.S. at 310.
61
Id. at 309.
62 Id. at 324.
63
Id. at 315-16.
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was available to all defendants under Harlow v. Fitzgerald.64 The
court construed Harlow as shielding government officials from liability for wrongdoing if the right allegedly violated was not "clearly
established" at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. 6 5 The Jensen
court held that a fourteenth amendment right to protection was not
"clearly established" by federal law because the government inaction at issue occurred before the post-1980 expansion of the duty to
protect in the Martinez-Fox line of cases. 6 6 TheJensen court therefore
67
extended good faith immunity to all defendants.
In addition, the court expressly rejected appellant's argument
that good faith immunity should not be available because the state
Child Protection Act clearly established an affirmative duty to protect. 68 The court insisted that the clear establishment of a right
under state law 69 is irrelevant to the question of whether a court
should grant immunity in a federal suit to vindicate that right as a
federally-created substantive right. Without considering the policies behind the good faith immunity doctrine, the court asserted
that in such a suit, the question controlling the application of immunity is simply whether federal law has clearly established the under70
lying right.
II
THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TEST

The Jensen court recognized that a "special relationship" between the state and the victim of a violent third party triggers a right
to protection under the fourteenth amendment. 7 1 Thus, the question controlling the merits of the claims presented in Jensen is
whether there was a "special relationship" between the state and the
decedent children in the sense in which the Fox court used the
457 U.S. 800 (1982).
747 F.2d at 194, 195 & n.12.
66 Id. at 194. The court mistakenly reported that both decedents died in the spring
of 1979, id., when in fact the decedent in Clark died in June 1980. Clark, 570 F. Supp. at
120. Although the incidents in Clark post-dated Martinez, which was decided onJanuary
15, 1980, they preceded the real expansion of the right to protection in Doe, Bowers, and
Fox. The court's error is therefore insignificant.
67
747 F.2d at 195. The court concluded that defendants could not have anticipated Fox. Id. at 194. It added that even if they had foreseen the Fox "special relationship" basis of an affirmative duty to protect, "it is not clear that under the facts of this
case the defendants could, or should, have foreseen that a 'special relationship' existed,"
because on the facts presented it was a "close" question. Id.
68 Id. at 195 n.12.
69 TheJensen court doubted that the South Carolina Child Protection Act clearly
established the children's right to protection. Id.
70
Id. The validity of this view is discussed infra, part III.
71
747 F.2d at 194-95; see supra note 67.
64

65
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term.7 2 The Fox court did not define the term "special relationship,"'7 3 but the Jensen court suggested three relevant factors: (1)
whether the state has or had custody of the victim or the attacker,
(2) whether the state had committed itself to protecting the victim,
and (3) whether the state knew of the danger to the victim. 74 The
court summarily assessed the strength of these factors in this case,
but it neither reached a conclusion on these facts nor assigned relative weights to the factors.7 5 The court also left the analysis open to
inclusion of other, unspecified factors.7 6 The court did recognize,
however, that the rationale for a fourteenth amendment right to
protection lies in the state's endangerment of an individual.7 7 But
rather than formulate a test based on this threshold criterion, the
court left the special relationship test a vague requirement seem78
ingly wholly fact-dependent.
Courts need a more coherent view of what should trigger a
fourteenth amendment right to protection in noncustodial contexts.
The Jensen court intended the term "special relationship" to be a
noncustodial analogue to a "custodial relationship" in which the
person in custody enjoys a right to protection under the fourteenth
amendment. 79 This analogy is logical because the cases finding
such a custodial relationship support the extension of the fourteenth amendment right to protection to persons not in custody.8 0
However, the facts that should trigger a right to protection when the
victim is not in the state's custody may not describe a "relationship"
72 For an argument that the state's failure to protect should be actionable under
"constitutional common law" by imposing an affirmative duty to act if "constitutional
values" require it, see Wells & Eaton, Affirmative Duty and ConstitutionalTort, 16 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 1 (1982). After discussing cases in which custody triggered a government's
constitutional duty to act, the article expressly rejects the "special relationship" approach to extending the duty to noncustodial situations:
We will not pursue further the question ofjust how much and what kind
of governmental involvement is necessary to justify a constitutional right
to government action. Instead, we will argue that the plaintiff should recover whether or not there is a constitutional right to protection as a matter of constitutional common law right.
Id. at 16. In another article, the authors argue that substantive due process principles
should define the scope of a constitutional tort. Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process
and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201 (1982).
73
See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
74
747 F.2d at 194 n.ll.
75
Id.
76 The court introduced its three factors stating, "we note that these cases underscore some of the facts that should be included in a 'special relationship' analysis." Id.
(emphasis added).
77
See supra text accompanying note 55.
78
See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
79
See supra note 57.
80 See supra notes 33-36, 42-43, 59-63 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 8689 and accompanying text.
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in the ordinary sense of the word. The term "special relationship"
is misleading because it invites inquiry into the nature of the relationship, if any, between state and victim. 8 1 Instead, courts should
focus on the effect of government actions on an individual's safety
to determine if a noncustodial victim enjoys a fourteenth amendment right to protection. Specifically, courts should find a special
relationship8 2 triggering a right to protection under the fourteenth
amendment only if (1) the government has created a risk of harm to
a particular person or persons, and (2) the risk is unreasonable.
Government risk-creation triggers the right to protection; the reasonableness standard defines its scope. The requirement of government risk-creation and the reasonableness standard are consistent
with the precedent and are supported by policy considerations.
A.

Government Risk-Creation

Two lines of precedent exist for expanding the fourteenth
amendment right to protection 83 to noncustodial situations: the
81 For example, in Beck v. Kansas Univ. Psychiatry Found., 580 F. Supp. 527, 534
(D. Kan. 1984), the court held that state hospital officials had a "special relationship"
with the allegedly foreseeable victims of a violent mental patient they had released,
solely because state tort law imposed on them responsibility for harm to foreseeable
victims. The case is wrongly decided because it bases a constitutional violation on the
existence of a state tort. The Supreme Court is opposed to such "federalizing" of state
tort claims through § 1983. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1976) (rejecting § 1983 claim on basis of police flyer identifying plaintiff as an "active shoplifter";
no property or liberty interest at stake).
Under this Note's proposed test, the plaintiff in Beck could have stated a constitutional claim because the hospital's release of the assailant constituted government riskcreation. The viability of the claim would turn on whether the decision to release the
assailant was reasonable.
82 For reasons of continuity, this Note will continue to use the term "special
relationship."
83 TheJensen court's history of the development of this right is largely complete. In
addition to the cases the court discussed, the court cited Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d
1096, 1101 (4th Cir. 1980) (prison official may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to
protect prisoners from harm inflicted by other inmates), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981);
Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 153, 163 (4th Cir. 1980) (prison officials have constitutional
duty to protect inmates), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980), and Davis v. Zahradnick, 600
F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979) (prison guards' failure to protect inmate from attack and
provide medical care for resulting injures is actionable under § 1983), as affirming the
eighth amendment duty of care established in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
747 F.2d at 191. See also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (inmates
have a right to be protected from other inmates); Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012
(5th Cir. 1981) (prisoner has a right to be protected from constant threat of violence);
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981).
The right of hospital patients to be protected from fellow patients is also well established. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) (involuntarily committed
mental patients have similar right to safety under fourteenth amendment as prisoners do
under eighth amendment); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974) (state
hospital inmate had fourteenth amendment right to protection from fellow inmates);
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"custody" cases8 4 and the "causation" cases. 8 5 In each series of
cases, state risk-creating action is essential to finding a right to protection. Thus, both lines of precedent support the inclusion of this
factor in a special relationship test.
1. The Custody Cases
The custody cases, Estelle, Doe, and Youngberg, provide the sturdiest foundation for an extension of the fourteenth amendment
right to protection to noncustodial settings.8 6 These cases impose a
constitutional duty on the state to protect an individual in custody
because that person is dependent on the state for protection.8 7 The
custody cases stress the "dependence" of an individual in custody,
rather than the risk or danger that custody presents. A prisoner or
hospital patient, however, is dependent on his custodians largely because the state's assertion of custody has severely restricted his capacity and resources to care for and protect himself. By
handicapping the individual, the state renders him more vulnerable
than he was before being taken into custody. The state thus endangers the individual by subjecting him to a risk he did not previously
face. Moreover, in prisons and hospitals government custodians directly endanger their wards by exposing them to others in custody
Gann v. Delaware State Hosp., 543 F. Supp. 268, 272 (D. Del. 1982) (state hospital had
constitutional duty to protect involuntarily committed patient from committing suicide;
his death not "too remote" from hospital officials' failure to carefully monitor him).
84
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981). See
supra text accompanying notes 33-36, 42-43; see also supra note 83.
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 86 (4th Cir.
85
1983); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying
notes 37-41, 44-58.
86 Only the custody cases have acknowledged a constitutional right to protection.
See supra notes 33-36, 42-43, 59-63 and accompanying text. The causation cases, Martinez, Bowers, and Fox, have denied relief; their discussions of the possibility of a successful
claim on different facts are dicta. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. Judge
Murnaghan, concurring inJensen, thought that because previous discussions were merely
dicta, the majority should not have speculated about the existence of a special relationship that could trigger a constitutional right to. protection. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 196
(Murnaghan, J., concurring).
87 See, e.g., Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 141 ("When individuals are placed in custody or under
the care of the government, their governmental custodians are sometimes charged with
affirmative duties, the non-feasance of which may violate the constitution."). The Estelle
Court stated in this regard, "'[I]t is but just that the public be required to care for the
prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.' " 429
U.S. at 104 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)).
The Court also stated: "an inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical
needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." Id. at 103. The
Youngberg Court stated that contrary to the general rule that "a State is under no constitutional duty to provide services for those within its border. . . . When a person is
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State-. . . a duty to provide certain
" 457 U.S. at 317 (citations omitted).
services and care does exist ..
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who may be violent or abusive. 8 8
A noncustodial situation will not involve the exact type of gov-

ernment risk-creation found in custody cases. However, if government risk-creation justifies a constitutional right to protection for
someone in custody,8 9 it should also justify a fourteenth amendment
right to protection for someone who is not in the state's custody but
is put in jeopardy by the state's action. Thus, government risk-creation is an appropriate factor in the special relationship test.
2.

The Causation Cases

The causation cases, Martinez, Bowers, and Fox, underscore the
importance of government risk-creation in finding a fourteenth
amendment right to protection in noncustodial situations. 90 These
cases held that the government action was too remote from the ultimate injury to justify imposing liability. 9 1 Where the government
92
cannot be deemed to have caused injury inflicted by a third party,
it is under no duty to protect the victims. 9 3 These cases clearly have
88

See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307, 310 (plaintiff mental patient, himself prone to

violence, suffered injuries on 63 occasions in two and one-half year period); Gullatte v.
Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff inmate, known as informant, murdered by other prisoners in new prison on day of transfer to that facility). Because of
their relative weakness and the acceptability of disciplinary measures, children are more
vulnerable than adults when placed in custody.
89 A right to protection and its correlative duty to protect may arise under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 3637 (6th Cir. 1973) (black residents have same right to police protection as white residents). However, "the utility of equal protection analysis in this area is severely limited
by Washington v. Davis[, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (intent to discriminate necessary to
success of equal protection claim)]," Wells & Eaton, Affirmative Duty and Constitutional
Tort, supra note 72, at 15. This Note addresses only a right to protection stemming from
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
90 The Bowers court stated in this regard:
If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and
then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was
merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him
into a snake pit.
686 F.2d at 618.
91
Martinez, Bowers, and Fox considered the liability of state parole boards or hospital officials for injury inflicted by individuals they released from custody. See supra text
accompanying notes 37-41, 44-58.
92 "JW]e hold that . . . appellees did not 'deprive' appellants' decedent of life
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285. The
fourteenth amendment may require a closer connection between action and injury to
establish legal causation than does tort law for proximate causation. The Court's holding in Martinez was made "[r]egardless of whether, as a matter of state tort law, the
parole board could be said either to have had a 'duty' to avoid harm to [the] victim or to
have proximately caused her death." Id.
93 See Bowers, 686 F.2d at 619:
A State may if it wants recognize positive duties of care and make the
breach of those duties tortious. But the only duties of care that may be
enforced in suits under section 1983 are duties founded on the Constitu-
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implied, however, that courts might find a fourteenth amendment
94
violation when the state action is factually closer to the injury.
The fourteenth amendment right so violated would be the right to
protection, 9 5 and the causation cases therefore support the view that
government risk-creation is necessary to trigger this fourteenth
amendment right.
In Martinez, for example, the evidence showed that the victim's
murder occurred five months after the parolee's release, the parolee
was not an "agent of the parole board," and the defendant parole
officers did not know that the victim faced any special danger "as
distinguished from the public at large." 96 By limiting its holding to
the particular circumstances of the case 9 7 and by refusing to decide
"that a parole officer could never be deemed to 'deprive' someone
of life by action taken in connection with the release of a prisoner on
parole," 98 the Martinez court implied that a victim's claim might succeed on facts which more closely tie the official's action to the resulting injury.
The Fox court applied the Martinez factors to similar but more
compelling facts. Unlike Martinez the defendant parole officers in
Fox had supervisory responsibilities over the parolee, and the victim's injury occurred only one month after the parolee's release. 99
As in Martinez, however, the defendants had no knowledge that the
particular victim faced danger.10 0 The Fox court denied the claimant
relief li but indicated that a special relationship between state and
02
victim might justify relief.'

94

95

tion or laws of the United States; and the duty to protect the public from
dangerous madmen is not among them.
See supra text accompanying notes 41, 55-56.

96

See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
444 U.S. at 285.

97
98

Id.
Id.

99
100

712 F.2d at 85-87.
Id.
101 Id. at 87; see also Humann v. Wilson, 696 F.2d 783, 784 (10th Cir. 1983) (victim's
claim failed on facts similar to Martinez except that time lapse between parolee's release
and injury was two months).
102
712 F.2d at 88. The Fox court noted that both Martinez and Bowers recognized
that the foreseeability of danger to a particular claimant would help tighten the causal
relationship between government action and ultimate injury. See Martinez, 444 U.S. at
285 (parole officers were unaware that victim, "as distinguished from the public at large,
faced any special danger"); Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618 (same). The Fox court thought that
such foreseeability would also help establish a "special relationship." 712 F.2d at 88. It
stated in this regard:
That defendants' unawareness of the specific risk emerges as a critical
factor under either a causation-focused or a right/duty analysis simply
bespeaks the inescapably "tort-like" nature of the § 1983 claim. . ..
The question whether in negligence cases foreseeability relates more
properly to defining duty or to assessing "legal cause" (or whether it
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A successful Martinez-type claim might be viewed merely as
presenting more compelling facts for a holding that state officials
actually caused a victim's injuries. Accordingly, a claim relying on
the Martinez language might allege, for example, that the acts of a
parolee constituted state action that deprived the victim of his life in
contravention of the fourteenth amendment. 10 3 In approving such a
claim, however, a court would have to infer that state inaction violated the fourteenth amendment right to protection because the
gravamen of a victim's claim in such a case is not that the state took
the victim's life, but rather that the state failed to protect the victim
from a third party.' 0 4 Thus, the claim actually amounts to an allegation that the state violated the victim's fourteenth amendment right
to protection.
In sum, the causation cases imply that a fourteenth amendment
right to protection arises in noncustodial situations only when the
government creates a risk of such magnitude that a court would find
that the government action caused the injury. The legal standard by
which the courts judge the government action defines the requisite
magnitude of risk. 05
3.

Policy Considerations

Requiring the existence of government risk-creation before a
right to protection is implied under the fourteenth amendment is
makes any difference) is of course one of the most profound and persistent ones in the evolution of that body of common law tort doctrine.
Id. at 88 n.3 (citation omitted). Under the test proposed by this Note, the foreseeability
of harm to particular individuals is a factor in deciding whether the state's conduct was
reasonable. See infra part IIB. In the context of violence by a released parolee, the release itself would provide the requisite risk-creating action.
103
Some courts have interpreted Martinez as requiring such an approach. See, e.g.,
Brown, 570 F. Supp. at 106-08 (applying Supreme Court's state action test from Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), to appellant's claim, finding no state action in parent's
killing of decedent child and dismissing claim for this reason, citing Martinez); Estate of
Bailey v. York, 580 F. Supp. 794 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (following Brown's state action analysis
on similar facts).
104 The Fox court recognized that when an individual brings suit under § 1983
against a government official responsible for the release of a parolee who subsequently
injures him,
the claimant . . . assert[s] the right [under the fourteenth amendment]
not to be injured in person or property by the irresponsible failure of the
state to protect [him] against any risks of harm posed to [him] by a state
parolee under the direct supervision of the state's agents. In sum, the
right asserted is the right to be protected by the state from the possible depredations of a convicted criminal with known dangerous propensities who is
under the direct supervision of the state's agents.
712 F.2d 84, 87-88 (4th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
i05 The standard implied by the Martinez opinion is unclear. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98. A fourteenth amendment right to protection should be triggered by
unreasonable government risk-creation. See infra part IIB.
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consistent with the principle that constitutional rights are "negative" in nature. Constitutional rights prohibit government invasion
of protected interests, 10 6 but rarely 10 7 do they require government
action or aid.' 0 8 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment creates such a negative right. It strikes a balance between citizen and state by commanding that a "State [shall not] deprive any
10 9
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"'
although it does not grant the public a "right to be protected by the
state against. . . criminals or madmen. '""I0 However, when a government affirmatively subjects a particular individual to a risk of
harm, it upsets this balance by beginning the process by which life,
liberty, or property may be deprived. In such a situation, the government action justifies the implication of a substantive right to protection, and the imposition of the state's duty to protect. Imposing
a duty to protect when the state affirmatively endangers an individual does not undermine the principle that affirmative constitutional
rights are disfavored.
B.

The Reasonableness Standard

The special relationship test also should include the requirement that the risk posed to the plaintiff by government action be
unreasonable; the plaintiff must show that those who acted exercised unreasonable judgment."' This reasonableness standard
strikes the proper balance between the legitimate state and private
1 12
interests identified by the Supreme Court in Youngberg v.Romeo.
Furthermore, the reasonableness standard follows Youngberg in rejecting the lesser duty of care embodied in the deliberate indifference standard which courts applied in the early cases considering
106 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 414 (2d ed.
1983) ("Almost all of the constitutional protections of individual rights ...
restrict...

the actions of governmental entities.").
107
Some exceptions are the eighth and fourteenth amendment rights to protection
while in government custody; fifth and fourteenth amendment equal protection rights,
see supra note 89; affirmative rights attendant to the first amendment, see Emerson, The
Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. Rav. 795 (1981); and procedural due

process protection under the fourteenth amendment of substantive liberty and property
rights, see infra note 179.
108 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (no constitutional right to
funding for abortions); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (no constitutional

right to housing).
109 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
111 The inquiry into the requisite unreasonableness may focus on the conduct that
produced the risk or the magnitude of the risk itself. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 31, at 169-73 (5th ed. 1984).
112 457 U.S. 307 (1981).
110
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the fourteenth amendment right to protection.1 1 3 The reasonableness standard departs from the Youngberg holding, however, by rejecting the professional judgment standard because it would not
adequately protect individuals' safety.
In Youngberg the Supreme Court held that a state mental hospital patient's fourteenth amendment right to safe conditions of confinement' 14 is not violated when he suffers injury from other
patients, if hospital officials have exercised "professional judgment"
in providing "reasonable conditions of safety." "1 5 The Youngberg
Court recognized an involuntarily committed patient's constitutional right to reasonable safety, 116 but it also recognized the need
to help "often . . . overcrowded and understaffed [state institutions] to continue to function." 1 7 The Court concluded that the
professional judgment standard represented the proper balance between these conflicting interests. 118 The Youngberg professional
judgment standard properly determines the scope of the fourteenth
amendment right to protection in a custodial context, but it inadequately protects a noncustodial victim's right to protection from a
state-created risk. Nonetheless, the state and private interests the
Youngberg Court identified and the principle from Youngberg that they
must be balanced should determine the standard in the special relationship test.
The reasonableness standard properly balances a noncustodial
individual's interest in safety against the state's interest in facilitating the operation of its institutions. 1 9 An individual's interest in
113
See, e.g., Doe I, discussed supra text accompanying notes 42-43; see also Turpin v.
Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1980) (requiring deliberate indifference or gross neg-

ligence on part of police to support claim that officers violated plaintiffs fourteenth
amendment rights through repeated unlawful arrests).
114
The harm to which plaintiff-patient was exposed was injury inflicted by other
patients or by himself. 457 U.S. at 310. The patient's right to safe conditions of confinement means the right to be protected from such injury. See supra note 83.
115 457 U.S. at 321. The Court found that plaintiff-respondent had a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety," id. at 318, and referred to it variously as a right
to "reasonable conditions of safety," id. at 321, "reasonable safety," id. at 324, and
"conditions of reasonable . . . safety," id. This Note considers these characterizations
of the right to be synonymous. The word "reasonable" in these formulations modifies
the conditions of safety to be achieved, not the "professional judgment" exercised in
achieving them. For an argument that Youngberg implicitly requires that judgment to be
reasonable but allows a presumption of reasonableness from proof that the judgment
was "professional," see infra note 119.
116 457 U.S. at 324. The Court also held that such patients have a right to be free
from "unreasonable restraints," id. at 321, as well as a right to "such training as may be
reasonable in light" of these interests, id. at 322.
117
Id. at 324. The Court stated, "By so limiting judicial review of challenges to
conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with the internal
operation of these institutions should be minimized." Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
118

Id. at 321.

119

Arguably, the Youngberg Court actually endorsed the reasonableness standard. In
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safety is not absolute; it must be balanced against" 'the demands of
an organized society.' "120 The standard imposed by the special relationship test will determine not only the scope of an individual's
safety, but also the degree to which government officials are restricted in their decisions which pose risks to society. As a matter of
policy, government officials should be expected to act in an objectively reasonable manner, 12 1 and the reasonableness standard is
therefore appropriate. A higher standard of care, requiring that
government officials' risk-creating actions be based on "compelling" or "substantial" necessity, 122 would unduly restrict officials'
ability to perform their duties; often their duties involve risk-assessment which is unsuited to such findings. 123 On the other hand, a
recognizing a right to minimally adequate training, the Court stated that the Constitution requires "such training as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In determining what is
'reasonable' . . . we emphasize that courts must show deference to thejudgment exercised by a qualified professional." 457 U.S. at 322. Thus, the Court seemed to require
that a professional's choice of a patient's training program, which determines the extent
of his safety and freedom, must be reasonable. However, anxious to minimize the intrusion of federal courts into the management of state institutions, see id. at 322-23 ("there
certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals to prescribe conditions within state hospitals), the Youngberg Court ruled that a
court should find a constitutional violation only if a professional's decision was "such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment. . . as to demonstrate that
[it was not] such a judgment," id. at 323. In effect, the Court established a conclusive
presumption of reasonableness once a defendant shows that a challenged decision was
based on professional judgment. The Court could have retained reasonableness as the
ultimate standard of proof but declared that a showing that a professional judgment was
made triggers a presumption that the judgment was reasonable, which the claimant
could then rebut. By flatly denying liability when it finds that a judgment was "professional," the Court set a more lenient standard than reasonableness. See infra notes 13136 and accompanying text.
120
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
121
This principle is the foundation of the qualified immunity doctrine. See infra text
accompanying notes 75-78.
122
These tests were rejected by the Youngberg Court because they "would place an
undue burden on the administration of [state institutions] and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional judgment as to the needs of residents." 457 U.S. at
322. The same argument applies to the latitude of decisionmaking available to other
officials such as parole officers or child abuse workers.
123
The Clark court recognized this point and used it to help explain the result in
Martinez:
In Martinez, the Parole Board was performing a discretionary risk-assessing function. A strong argument can be made that in order to provide
the members of the Parole Board with the necessary flexibility of judgment to properly perform such a function, they must be given significant
protection from suit.
570 F. Supp. at 132 n.12. Furthermore, when government officials pose a danger to an
individual, they seek to achieve a substantive goal in spite of the danger created. See, e.g.,
G. GIARDINI, THE PAROLE PROCESS 5 (1959) (purpose of parole is to "restor[e] the offender to normal social functioning");J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, BEFORE THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 5 (1979) (social workers should always attempt to keep
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lower duty of care, as reflected in standards such as gross negligence or deliberate indifference, would subject individuals to unanticipated dangers. The principle of tort law that individuals are
entitled to expect non-negligent behavior from those who perform
acts that might affect them 124 supports the reasonableness standard
as a matter of policy.
The reasonableness standard is consistent with Youngberg in rejecting the deliberate indifference standard. The Supreme Court
adopted the "deliberate indifference" standard 12 5 in Estelle v. Gamble, 126 holding that prison officials' intentional and deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs would constitute
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" in violation of the
eighth amendment. 12 7 The Court ruled that mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a prisoner's medical needs would not support
1 28
such a claim.
The Youngberg Court unanimously rejected the deliberate indifference standard, 12 9 reasoning that those who have been "involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish."' 30 Under Youngberg's reasoning,
unsuspecting citizens in the community deserve greater consideration for their safety than do prisoners. Thus, Youngberg demonstrates that the deliberate indifference standard does not require a
sufficiently high duty of care to adequately protect noncustodial victims of state-created harm.
Nonetheless, the reasonableness standard rejects the Youngberg
professional judgment standard because it also inadequately protects private interests. Under Youngberg's standard, a hospital proabused child in own family, because "his paramount interest lies in the preservation of
his family"). A standard of care more stringent than reasonableness would interfere
with the accomplishment of these goals. A higher standard would also deter social
workers from returning abused children to potentially abusive families and would, therefore, conflict with the rights of parents to maintain custody of their children. For a
thorough discussion of the possible infringement of parents' family rights by state child
abuse and neglect statutes, see Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Scope of State Child
Neglect Statutes, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1979).
124 See, e.g., W. KEETON, supra note 111, § 53, at 358-59.
125 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 312 n.l1.
126 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
127 Id. at 104.
Id. at 106; see also Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 143-44 (simple negligence probably does not
128
establish deliberate indifference, although gross negligence may create a "strong presumption of deliberate indifference").
129 Chief Justice Burger, who concurred only in the judgment, joined the majority
and other concurring Justices on this point. 457 U.S. at 331.
130 Id. at 321-22. Arguably, prisoners are also entitled to greater protection under
the eighth amendment than the deliberate indifference standard affords. Analysis of this
question is beyond the scope of this Note.
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fessional 3 l is liable for violating a patient's fourteenth amendment
right to reasonable safety only if her decision in prescribing the patient's conditions of confinement was "such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment . . . as to demonstrate that
[she] did not base the decision on such ajudgment."' 1 2 This standard apparently133 requires a showing of mere rationality and allows
decisions to pass constitutional muster as long as they are not professionally irrational or baseless. 13 4 Such decisions could be less
than reasonable and yet still be professionally rational because a
decisionmaker may have a rational basis for a decision that falls
short of what a reasonable decisionmaker in his position would have
done.1 3 5 The professional judgment standard is thus less rigorous
than the reasonableness standard. Because noncustodial individuals
should not be subjected to unreasonable risks of harm,13 6 the professional judgment standard provides inadequate protection. Like
Estelle's deliberate indifference test, Youngberg's professional judgment standard is too low for the special relationship test.
C.

Summary

The special relationship test should consider two factors. If a
plaintiff shows first, that the state created a risk of harm to him, and
second, that the risk was unreasonable, courts should find that the
plaintiff has a right to protection under the fourteenth amendment.
III
GOOD FAITH IMMUNITY

The good faith, or qualified, immunity doctrine1 3 7 shields gov131 The Court defined a "'professional' decisionmaker" as "a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue."
Id. at 323 n.30.

132

Id. at 323.

133

See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 59, at 80 (Youngberg court

"fail[ed] to specify the standard by which courts should review psychiatric
decisionmaking").
134

This view interprets the test's language, see supra text accompanying note 132, to

mean that only the decisions that are so clearly not based on accepted professional standards that they may be deemed arbitrary or irrational would fail. Therefore, any rational
professional judgment would pass the test.
135 See W. KEETON, supra note 72, § 32, at 173-79 (describing "reasonable person"
concept).
136 See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.

137 Qualified immunity is a judge-made immunity granted to some officials who are
defendants in § 1983 actions. Arguably, Congress did not intend any common law immunity defenses to apply to claims brought under § 1983. See Gildin, The Standard of
Culpabilityin Section 1983 and Bivens Actions: The PrimaFade Case, QualifiedImmunity and the

Constitution, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557, 579-81 (1983). Its scope is narrower than that of
absolute immunity, which affords a complete defense to liability to public officers such as
state and local legislators,judges, and prosecutors, for their official actions. Courts have
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ernment officials from liability for their violations of federal rights if
they act in good faith. 138 The Supreme Court set forth its most recent formulation of the good faith immunity test in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.13 9 The Harlow Court ruled that government officials should be
immunized if "their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
140
would have known."'
In construing the Harlow test, the Jensen court had to decide
whether immunity should be available to officials who violate federal
rights that were not clearly established by federal law at the time of
the violation if the same rights were clearly established by state
law.' 4 ' The policies underlying the good faith immunity doctrine
applied the common law doctrine of absolute immunity to § 1983 suits. Id. at 580-81.
None of the defendants inJensen claimed absolute immmunity, nor could they successfully have asserted it. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242-44 (1974) (state
governor and other top executive officials do not enjoy absolute immunity).
138
Qualified immunity was first granted in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), in
which the Court held that police officers were entitled to immunity for an arrest made
under an unconstitutional statute because they acted in good faith and on probable
cause. In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975), the Supreme Court established
a two-part test for good faith immunity, including both objective and subjective components: immunity would not be granted to an official (1) "if he knew or reasonably should
have known" that his action would violate the claimant's clearly established constitutional rights or (2) if he acted with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the claimant.
139 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The Court interpreted this test more recently in Davis v.
Scherer, 104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984). See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
140
Id. at 818. The Harlow Court thus dropped the subjective element of the Wood
two-part test. See supra note 101. However, this change is irrelevant to the good faith
immunity issue in Jensen which concerns only the objective aspect of the test. See infra
text accompanying note 141.
The Harlow court's inclusion of "statutory rights" in the good faith immunity test
does not include state statutory rights in the scope of the test. Rather it refers to federal
statutory rights and reflects the fact that two of the three federal claims in that case were
statutory. 457 U.S. at 805 (petitioner brought two claims as "implied" by federal statutes and one claim directly under the Constitution); see also id. at 818 n.30 (although no
§ 1983 claim was presented, the court noted that its ruling on good faith immunity
should apply in § 1983 suits). The Clark court stated that this language in the Harlow
test requires that clearly established state statutory rights bar good faith immunity in a
suit alleging the violation of those same rights under federal law. 570 F. Supp. at 127
n.26. Such a view ignores the nature of the claims asserted in Harlow.
141
See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. All of theJensen defendants claimed
immunity from suit in federal court under the eleventh amendment, which bars federal
court from hearing suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official
capacities. See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48, at 291 (4th ed. 1983); P.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 203-09 (1983). County officials, however, are not protected by the eleventh amendment. C. WRIGHT, supra, § 46, at 274. In Brown the court
granted eleventh amendment immunity to the State Commissioner, state board members, and a state employee who were sued in their official capacities. 570 F. Supp. at 98.
The court "reserved for later decision" the question of whether county board members
are also entitled to immunity. Id. at 99 n. 1. The court held that the defendants, sued in
their individual capacities, were not shielded by eleventh amendment immunity but
might be protected by good faith immunity, and it proceeded to consider this issue. Id.

1985]

RIGHT TO PROTECTION

961

indicate that courts should not grant immunity in such a situation,
although recent case law requires the opposite conclusion.
In Davis v. Sckerer14 2 the Supreme Court held that state officials
who violate federal constitutitonal rights not clearly established at
the time of the violation enjoy immunity from suit even though by
the same action they violate rights clearly established by state regulations. 14 3 In Davis officials fired a state policeman for failing to quit
his job outside the police force when ordered to. The officials did
not conduct a formal pre-termination or a prompt post-termination
hearing. 14 4 The district court held that this omission violated the
policeman's fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process
and that the defendant officials could not be immunized from suit
because they violated a departmental regulation that clearly commanded them to investigate the policeman's alleged wrongdoing
and elicit his statement. 14 5 After affirmance by the Fifth Circuit, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if a state official violates
the clear command of a state regulation he does not forfeit his immunity from suit for deprivation of a constitutional right not clearly
14 6
established at the time of his action.
The Davis result was presaged by the Court's opinion in
Procunierv. Navarette.14 7 In Procunier,the Supreme Court ignored the
fact that prison officials' actions that allegedly violated the prisonerplaintiffis constitutional rights also violated state prison regulations. 148 The Court granted immunity to the officials because fed149
eral constitutional law had not yet clearly established the rights.
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued' 5 0 that because the rights allegedly violated were clearly established by state prison regulations,
the officials could not be said to have acted in good faith. Thus,
at 100 & n.2. Eleventh amendment immunity was not raised as an issue on appeal in
Jensen. Full discussion of its reach is beyond the scope of this Note.
142
104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984).
143
Id. at 3019-21.
144 Id. at 3016.
145
Id. at 3016-17. Initially the court denied the defendants immunity because it
found that the policeman's due process right to a pre-termination or a prompt posttermination hearing was clearly established when he was fired in 1977. Id. at 3016. On
reconsideration, in light of a Fifth Circuit opinion to the contrary, the court rescinded
this finding and substituted the reasoning cited in the text. Id.
146
Id. at 3019-21. Although this holding addresses squarely the question theJensen
court faced, and the Davis opinion precededJensen by over three months, theJensen court
did not cite Davis.
147 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
148
The Supreme Court mentioned the regulations only as background. Id. at 557.
149 Id. at 565.
150 The appellant in Jensen also made this argument, see supra text accompanying
notes 68-70, as did the appellee in Davis, 104 S.Ct. at 3019. This Note attributes the
approach to Justice Stevens.
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Stevens contended, they should not be immunized from suit. 15 '
Although the Procunier majority did not expressly reject this ap152
proach, the Davis Court did.
The conflicting policies underlying the good faith immunity
doctrine call for the adoption of Stevens's approach. Those policies
include providing a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens
on the one hand, and encouraging" 'the vigorous exercise of official
authority'" on the other. 153 The Stevens rule, which would deny
immunity when state law clearly establishes an allegedly violated
right, advances the policy of providing a remedy for violations of
citizens' rights. The rule would preclude granting the good faith
immunity defense on summary judgment and terminating the
suit. 154 Instead, a plaintiff could proceed to trial on the merits of his
claim. 155 The Stevens rule would thus provide plaintiffs an opportunity to seek a remedy for violations of federal rights which good
faith immunity might otherwise block.
In the Court's view, providing remedies for violations of individuals' rights conflicts with the policy of promoting the exercise of
official discretion because the threat of suit might deter government
officials from acting.156 The Court has resolved this conflict by ruling that if an official acts in an objectively reasonable manner, he
will not be liable for his actions. 15 7 The Stevens rule is entirely con434 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-06

151
152
153

(1978)).
154
A major objective of the doctrine of good faith immunity has been the termination of "[i]nsubstantial lawsuits" at the summary judgment stage. Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978). This goal justified the Harlow Court's rejection of the
subjective element of the test. 457 U.S. at 815-18. Adoption of the Stevens approach
would not thwart this policy because the court could still grant immunity on summary
judgment if federal or state law did not clearly establish the rights allegedly violated.
Furthermore, claims which have no basis as a matter of federal law may still be dismissed
by summary judgment on the merits.
155
To prevail in a § 1983 claim a plaintiff must prove a violation of a federal right.
See supra note 2. A showing that official conduct violated clearly established state rights
would serve only to negate immunity to the federal claim. It would not convert a state
tort into a federal claim by way of § 1983. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1976).
156 In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975), for example, the Court
stated: "[t]he imposition of the monetary costs for mistakes which were not unreasonable in light of all the circumstances would undoubtedly deter even the most conscien-

tious

. . .

decisionmaker from exercising his judgment independently.

.

.

. The most

capable candidates for [official] positions might be deterred from seeking office."
157 "[IThe immunity must be such that. . . officials understand that action taken in
good-faith fulfillment of their responsibilities and within the bounds of reason under all the
circumstances will not be punished and that they need not exercise their discretion with
undue timidity." Id. at 321 (emphasis added). The Harlow Court viewed its test as
"[r]ely[ing] on the objective reasonablenessof an official'sconduct, as measured by reference to
clearly established law." 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that
this standard was fair, because
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sistent with this principle. If a state official violates rights that are
clearly established by state law, his conduct is not objectively reasonable. Therefore, "he should be made to hesitate"1 5 8 and should
not enjoy immunity from suit. In such a case, immunity does not
further the policy of protecting the reasonable exercise of official
power. The situation is analogous to granting immunity to an official who violates rights clearly established by federal law. In each
case the inquiry is whether the official acted in an objectively reasonable manner. In each case the answer is no, because his acts conflict
159
with the "law governing his conduct."
The Stevens approach does not hinder the policy of protecting
the reasonable exercise of official authority. Rather, it logically extends the policy by examining relevant state laws to determine the
reasonableness of the official's conduct. In addition, the Stevens approach furthers the policy of providing a remedy for constitutional
violations. Thus, this approach furthers both of the policies underlying the good faith immunity doctrine. Courts should deny a good
faith immunity defense to an official sued for allegedly violating a
plaintiff's federal right when state law clearly establishes an
equivalent right.
a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct ....
• . . The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts. Where an official could
be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate ....
Id. at 819.
457 U.S. at 819. The Clark court recognized that because "holding [an] official
158
liable in such a case [will not] place undesirable restraints on his flexibility," good faith
immunity should not apply. 570 F. Supp. at 127. See also supra text accompanying note
151.
159
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
Although it recognized that the objective reasonableness of officials' action is the
test for good faith immunity, the Davis Court rejected the Stevens approach because it
would over-deter public officials from acting. 104 S.Ct. at 3019-21. In the Court's view,
officials would not be able to "reasonably. . .anticipate" the scope of their liability and
carry out their official duties with confidence if they could be held liable for violating
federal rights nonexistent at the time of the violation "merely because their official conduct also violated some [state] statute or regulation." Id. at 3020 (emphasis added).
This view presumes that the deterrence such a rule would effect is undesirable, and it
therefore contradicts the policy established in Harlow that government officials should
be expected to act in an objectively reasonable manner. If an official violates a clear
statute or regulation governing his conduct, his action is hardly reasonable. See supra
note 157 and accompanying text. Furthermore, it would shield from federal liability a
government official who chooses to violate a clear state statute or regulation and thereby
incur liability only under state law, knowing that the federal right is not clearly established. Such official action is patently unreasonable, however, and should not be
encouraged.
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IV
APPLICATION TO JENSEN

Had it properly applied the good faith immunity doctrine, the
Jensen court would have faced only appellant's claim against the Clark
caseworkers. The court should have dismissed that claim as a matter of law because the facts do not indicate that the government created a risk.
A.

Good Faith Immunity

Courts should deny good faith immunity to state officials who
violate rights clearly established by state law even if federal law did
not clearly establish those rights at the time of the violation.1 60
Therefore, the Jensen court should have considered whether the
rights allegedly violated in Clark and Brown were clearly established
by the South Carolina Child Protection Act. 1 6 1 The Brown court
made no findings on this question; therefore, theJensen court should
not have granted immunity to the Brown defendants. The court
should have remanded the case for consideration of whether state
law clearly established a right to intervention and protection which
16 2
state and county officials allegedly violated.
The Clark court, however, considered the effect of state law and
found that the state and county board members were entitled to
good faith immunity, but the caseworkers were not. 163 The court
found that state law imposed upon the state and county board members only "a general, vaguely defined duty to 'conduct training programs.' "164 Because the meaning of this imperative was not
"clearly established," the court reasoned that the board members
were entitled to immunity.' 6 5 The court noted, however, that the
caseworkers did "not stand on the same legal footing"' 16 6 as the
board members. It found that state law "specifically defined" the
160

See supra part III.

161

S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-480 to -490 (Law. Co-op. 1985). See supra note 21.

162 The Jensen court noted that such a right may not be clearly established: "The
[State] Act does not create an express duty of intervention but rather provides only that
the State 'may' intervene." 747 F.2d at 195 n.12.
163 570 F. Supp. at 127.
164 Id. at 125 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-660(A) (Law. Co-op. 1985)). Other
sections of the South Carolina Child Protection Act impose additional duties on the
state and county boards. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-660(B) (Law. Co-op. 1985)
(duty to publicize problems of child abuse), § 20-7-640(C) (duty to review services offered throughout the state, assist in diagnosis of abuse, coordinate referrals). The appellant predicated the board members' liability on their failure to adequately train the
caseworkers primarily responsible for the decedent's case, 570 F. Supp. at 120; therefore, the court identified this section as the most relevant.
165 570 F. Supp. at 127.
166 Id. at 125.
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caseworkers' obligations,1 6 7 including the duty to "'commence an
appropriate and thorough investigation' "within twenty-four hours of
a report of abuse. 168 The court reasoned that because this duty was
"clearly established," the caseworkers who allegedly violated it169
could not be deemed "to have acted in 'good faith' " and, therefore,
were not entitled to immunity. 170 In light of these findings, theJensen court should have granted immunity to the state and county
board members in Clark and then considered the merits of appellant's claim against the caseworkers.
B.

The Merits

To prove the existence of a fourteenth amendment right to protection, a claimant must show that the government created an unreasonable risk of harm. 17 1 TheJensen court should have dismissed
appellant's claim against the Clark caseworkers on its merits because
no affirmative government action created a risk of harm to the decedent child.
The plaintiff in Clark claimed only that state social workers
failed to investigate a report of child abuse' 72 as required by state
law 173 and that the child died as a result of this failure. 174 The third
party, who ultimately killed the boy, however, had access to him
before the state became aware of the boy's plight. State action in no
way enhanced the threat to the child. 175 The caseworkers did not
actually create a new risk; they merely, but tragically, failed to help a
child who was already endangered.' 76 Because appellant's claim did
not allege government risk-creation, it fails the first prong of the
special relationship test. 17 7 The claim is therefore insufficient as a
matter of law to establish a right to protection under the fourteenth
79
amendment' 78 and must be dismissed.'
Id. at 127.
Id. at 126 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985)) (emphasis
added by Clark court).
169 The appellant in Clark alleged that the caseworkers failed to conduct a thorough
investigation. See supra note 12.
170
570 F. Supp. at 1276.
171
See supra discussion in part IIA.
172
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
173
See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
174
See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
175
The caseworkers never even located the child or his family. 747 F.2d at 188.
176 As theJensen court noted, this failure might be actionable in a state tort suit. Id.
at 196.
177
See supra text accompanying note 82.
178
The facts of Brown, however, present a much closer question. In that case, the
state's child protection agency allegedly arranged a change in the living arrangements of
the decedent child and her mother, apparently in an effort to protect the child. See supra
text accompanying notes 14-20. Whether these facts support a finding that the state
167
168
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CONCLUSION

InJensen v. Conrad, the Fourth Circuit considered the constitusubjected the child to a new risk is the first inquiry under the special relationship test.
TheJensen court stated that "[a]fter an initial review of the case, the [agency] allegedly
reached an agreement with Mrs. Brown requiring her to reside with Sylvia at the home
of Sylvia's grandmother." 747 F.2d at 187. If the state had taken emergency custody of
the child before reaching an agreement to release the child to its abusive mother, see
supra note 20, then the state clearly created a risk that the child did not face while she
was in the state's custody. Under the special relationship test, the court would then
review the decision to release the child to determine if it was reasonable. However, if
the state did not intervene and never removed the decedent child from her mother's
custody, it would be difficult on these facts to find that by its action, the state created a
risk of harm to the child that he did not previously face. The claim would fail the first
prong of the test. The court would not reach the question of whether the agency behaved reasonably, at least in the context of a claim that the decedent's fourteenth
amendment right was violated. The question would undoubtedly be relevant in a state
tort action.
179 Claimant could have pursued an alternative theory of recovery, based on a violation of procedural due process, which is actionable under § 1983. Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247 (1978). Instead of attempting to establish a substantive right to protection
under the fourteenth amendment, the Clark appellant could have asserted that the decedent had a substantive right to an investigation, created by state law and procedurally
protected by the fourteenth amendment; the state's failure to adequately investigate his
plight deprived him of that right without due process of law.
Substantive liberty and property rights may arise under state law. Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (protected liberty interest is created if state law, using "language of an unmistakably mandatory character" places "substantive predicates" on official's discretion to deprive individual of benefit granted by state law); Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (property interest created if state law grants "legitimate claim of entitlement" to property). The right of an abused child to an investigation
would best be characterized as a liberty interest because it is related to the child's bodily
security, a "historic liberty interest," Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977),
but the line between liberty and property is far from clear. See generally Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (avoiding liberty or property label, Court deemed state
driver's license protected because it is "important" interest); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and
"Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977). Under Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72, the language of the statute controls.
Under the South Carolina Children's Code, a local child protection agency "shall
commence an appropriate and thorough investigation" within 24 hours of receiving a
report of abuse. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985). It is directed to
classify the report within 60 days and to determine whether the report should be dismissed or pursued by reference to the specific standard of whether "abuse or neglect is
more likely than not to have occurred." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(D) (Law. Co-op.
1985). Under the Hewitt test for state-created liberty interests, 459 U.S. at 471, the statute arguably creates a substantive liberty interest in an investigation and determination
of the merits of a report of suspected abuse because it uses mandatory language to grant
an investigation and places substantive restrictions on agency discretion to withdraw it.
But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(E)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985) ("If no finding has beed
made

. . .

after sixty days

. .

.[the report of suspected abuse] shall be classified 'Un-

founded for want of an investigation.' ").
The next inquiry is what process the fourteenth amendment due process clause requires and whether the actual procedures satisifed that requirement. See, e.g., Hewitt, 459
U.S. at 472. Procedural due process requirements are flexible and vary depending on
the factual context and the weights of the private and state interests involved. Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). A complete analysis of due process requirements
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tional tort liability of state officials who allegedly caused harm to
abused children by failing to protect them from their abusers. The
court determined that if the state has received a report alleging the
abuse of a child, that child may have a fourteenth amendment right
to protection due to his "special relationship" with the state. The
state's failure to protect the child may therefore give rise to a claim
under section 1983. TheJensen court held, however, that because
the fourteenth amendment right to protection was not "clearly established" when the events in these cases occurred, the officials
were entitled to good faith immunity.
The court's "special relationship" approach to finding a fourteenth amendment right to protection is unsatisfactorily vague.
Both precedent and policy suggest that a court should not imply a
right to protection under the fourteenth amendment unless the
state has created an unreasonable risk of harm. Furthermore, state
officials should not enjoy good faith immunity in federal suits if their
actions violate rights dearly established by state law, even if those
rights are not clearly established by federal law.
Instead of granting immunity to all of the defendants inJensen,
the Fourth Circuit should have reached the merits of one of the
claims presented. The court should have dismissed that claim because it failed to establish a fourteenth amendment right to protection as a matter of law.
John B. Kassel

under Mathews in this situation is beyond the scope of this Note; suffice it to say, a properly alleged procedural due process claim may have survived a motion to dismiss.

